Mechanism Design for the Augmented two-Dimensional Inner Product

Chunping Wang

Abstract


In this paper, we consider the mechanism design for the augmented two-dimensional inner product . We obtain the reflexive rectangle method correspondence V(•) and the reflexive rectangle method covering that is a partition. After that, we construct the message space M, the equilibrium message function g and the outcome function h which constitute the mechanism . Furthermore we prove that the mechanism can realize the given goal function F. Finally we demonstrate the mechanism can satisfy informational efficiency and decentralization.


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